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MIRANDA SURVIVES TO BE HEARD:
DICKERSON v. UNITED STATES
JAMES T. PISCIOTTAt
INTRODUCTION
Very few Supreme Court decisions find their way out of the
hallowed halls of academia into the stream of the American
conscience. Even fewer decisions of the Court enjoy such
practical and common enforcement as to render its holding a
deeply embedded value of American culture. Still fewer cases
epitomize an area of law with such vigor and clarity as to wholly
symbolize the ideal of American justice. In 1966, the Supreme
Court, in a landmark opinion penned by Chief Justice Warren,
decided Miranda v. Arizona,1  thereby achieving the
aforementioned accolades and forever changing the landscape of
American criminal procedure.
In its most general sense, Miranda effectively departed from
the accepted standard that governed the admissibility of
confessions and established that certain safeguards, which have
t J.D. Candidate June 2001, St. John's University School of Law; B.S.,
Greensboro College.
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Four separate cases were under appeal and heard
collectively in the Miranda case. See Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 684, 686-
88 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding that defendant's confession of federal offenses made
while in state police custody for state offenses was admissible where no abuses were
shown), overruled by Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); State v.
Miranda, 401 P.2d 721, 733 (Ariz. 1965) (holding that defendant's confession was
inadmissible when the police informed defendant of his rights but did not
specifically inform of his right to assistance of counsel), overruled by Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); People v. Steward, 400 P.2d 97, 102 (Cal. 1965)
(finding that the defendant was entitled to counsel when a confession was taken and
defendant had been in custody for five days), overruled by Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); Vignera v. United States, 207 N.E.2d 527 (N.Y. 1965)
(determining that a confession obtained by the assistant district attorney, prior to
the arraignment deprived the defendant of his right to counsel), overruled by
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). See generally Paul G. Cassell, The
Statute Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L.
REV. 175, 181-91 (1999) (providing an overview of the facts surrounding the arrest
and interrogation of Miranda).
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collectively become known as the "Miranda Rights," must be
communicated to an accused before any statement may be
admitted into evidence. This Comment submits that the
Supreme Court, in Dickerson v. United States,2 was erroneous in
concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 was inapplicable, thereby
allowing Miranda and its doctrine to continue as the prevailing
standard governing the admissibility of defendant confessions.
The issue before the Court in Miranda was the admissibility
of self-incriminating statements made by the accused during a
police interrogation "while in custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action."3 In short, the Court ruled that "the
prosecution may not use [an accused's] statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory ... unless [the prosecution]
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure
the privilege against self-incrimination."4  The "procedural
safeguards" that the Court demanded be communicated to an
accused consisted of four simple warnings: (1) You have the right
to remain silent; (2) Anything you say may be used against you
in a court of law; (3) You have the right to an attorney; and (4) If
you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you.5
The ultimate import of the Court's decision was truly
revolutionary. In essence, Miranda extended the protections of
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination beyond
the controlled and monitored environment of the courthouse,
where it had only existed previously, to the dark, often suspect
setting of police interrogation rooms.6
2 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (holding that Miranda's warning-based approach to
determining admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation was
constitutionally-based and could not be overruled by legislation).
3 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445. In each of the cases that led up to the decision in
Miranda, the defendant was interrogated either by a police officer, detective, or a
prosecuting attorney in a room where he was isolated from the outside world. Id.
4 Id. at 444; see also Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431-32 (stating that the Miranda
Court held that "certain warnings must be given before a suspect's statement made
during custodial interrogation could be admitted in evidence").
5 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The language of the decision is often
paraphrased for ease of application. The precise language of the holding is as
follows: "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed." Id. The Court went on to rule that these rights may be waived by the
suspect provided that the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently. See id.
6 In pertinent part, the Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be
[Vol.75:673
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In justifying its decision, the Court reasoned that each of the
instant cases involved an "incommunicado interrogation of
individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-
incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional
rights."7 The Court was of the opinion that the communication
of warnings to the accused prior to interrogation would diminish
the "inherently compelling pressures" that exist when one is
questioned in the custody of authorities.8
In addition to the holding, the Miranda opinion contained an
interesting piece of dicta that suggested that this new rule of
evidence did not establish the outer limits of the required
constitutional protections, inviting Congress to exercise its
legislative might to create alternative safeguards to protect
against self-incrimination. 9 In the not so distant future, this
piece of dicta would serve as the political and judicial fodder to
fuel attacks upon Miranda.
... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. Prior to the Court's decision in Miranda, a voluntary confession obtained
in custody could be used in court, regardless of the person's knowledge of her
constitutional right against self-incrimination. See Patrick McDermott, United
States v. Dickerson: Has Miranda Been Overruled?, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 191, 194
(2000); see also Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514-15 (1963) (stating that the
inquiry used when determining whether a confession was admissible is whether the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated, not whether the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated); Wilson v. United
States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896) (holding that the "true test of admissibility is that
the confession is made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of
any sort.").
7 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
8 Id. at 467; see also Lucian Paul Sbarra, Note, Wiping the Dust Off of an Old
Statute: United States v. Dickerson Eliminates the Miranda Warnings, 35 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 481, 490 (2000) (stating that "the provision of these warning
requirements at the outset of the police interrogation would diminish the
'inherently compelling pressures' that presumptively arise during an interrogation
of the accused while in custody") (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445)).
9 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting
the privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the
exercise of their creative rule-making capacities. Therefore we cannot say
that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular
solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is
presently conducted. Our decision in no way creates a constitutional
straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended
to have this effect. We encourage Congress and the States to continue their
laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of
the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.
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In reaction to public sentiment surrounding Miranda,0 and
to the Court's open "invitation," Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. §
350111 with the "clear intention of restoring voluntariness as the
test for admitting confessions into federal court."12 In relevant
part, § 3501(a) reads: "In any criminal prosecution brought by
the United States... a confession... shall be admissible in
evidence if it is voluntarily given."13 Prior to Miranda, the
admissibility of a confession was determined under a
voluntariness test devised at common law.14  This test of
admissibility evolved from roots in the English common law,'5
10 See Sbarra, supra note 8, at 491 (stating that the initial public reaction to the
Miranda decision was hostile because it applied "retroactively to defendants who
had been interrogated but not tried before Miranda had been decided.").
11 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994) (passed as part of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of
1968).
12 United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S.
428 (2000); see also 114 CONG. REC. 11,201 (1968) (statement of Senator McClellan)
(stating that the "thrust of the Miranda ruling, if not changed, will sweep us into
the throes of anarchy and horror").
13 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1994) (emphasis added). The statute further provides
that when determining the admissibility of a confession, trial courts should
consider:
[AIll the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including
(1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant
making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment,
(2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he
was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the
confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he
was not required to make any statement and that any such statement
could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been
advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and
(5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel
when questioned and when giving such confession.
Id. § 3501(b).
14 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964) (stating that a conviction
violates due process if it is based in whole or in part on an involuntary confession);
Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1884) (stating the common law rule that
confessions must be voluntary if they are to be admitted into evidence); McDermott,
supra note 6, at 194 (noting that the earliest tests for admissibility of confessions
were based on voluntariness).
15 At early common law there was no requirement that confessions be
voluntary. See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 818
(James H. Chadbourn ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1970). Courts later began to realize
that coerced confessions were not reliable or trustworthy statements. See The King
v. Rudd, 168 Eng. Rep. 160, 163-64 (KB. 1793) (holding confessions obtained
through threats and promises were to be excluded from English courts); The King v.
Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (KB. 1783) ("[A] confession forced from the
mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a
shape when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be
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and over time, American case law established two constitutional
bases for the requirement that confessions be voluntary: the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 6 and the
Fourteenth Amendment right of due process. 17 Eventually, the
rule against admitting coerced or involuntary confessions
became based almost exclusively on due process rights, as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 18 In an interesting
aside, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in
Dickerson, noted that the due process method of jurisprudence
used by the Court to exclude involuntary confessions has never
been abandoned. 19
A precarious situation presented itself with the passage of
§ 3501. Congress had expressly restored voluntariness as the
touchstone of admissibility-seemingly in direct defiance of the
Supreme Court's teaching in Miranda. Nevertheless, for many
years, and through many administrations, the Justice
Department refused to enforce § 3501, as the statute was
believed to do violence to the Miranda doctrine.20  Similar
given to it; and therefore it is rejected.").
16 See Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (stating that the
voluntariness test is "controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment...
commanding that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself ") (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
17 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 280, 285-87 (1936) (holding criminal
conviction invalid under the Due Process Clause because it was based on a
confession obtained by physical coercion); see also Upshaw v. United States, 335
U.S. 410, 414 (1948) (finding that the challenged confessions were the "fiuits of
wrongdoing" by the police officers and thus inadmissible).
18 The Supreme Court applied the due process approach in numerous cases
where the test was refined into a specific factual inquiry of "whether a defendant's
will was overborne" by the circumstances surrounding the confession. Reck v. Pate,
367 U.S. 433, 440 (1961) (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940)); see also
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1964) (noting that the ultimate
inquiry is whether the confession was made voluntarily) (quoting Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961). This test took into consideration "the totality
of all the surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics of the accused and
the details of the interrogation." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226; see also Reck, 367
U.S. at 440 ("[A1ll the circumstances attendant upon the confession must be taken
into account."); Payne v. Arkansas 356 U.S. 560, 562 (1958) (declaring that a court
must review the circumstances under which a confession was made in determining
its admissibility); Fikes v. Alabama 352 U.S. 191, 197-98 (1957) ("he limits in any
case depend upon a weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the power of
resistance of the person confessing.") (quoting Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185
(1953)).
19 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432-34 (2000).
20 See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994) (relying in part on
United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350 (1994) and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
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sentiments were frequently voiced in the academic, political, and
popular arenas.21
Although § 3501 did not enjoy the support of the
Department of Justice or the courts, a string of Supreme Court
cases served to place great limitations on the once wide breadth
of the Miranda doctrine.22 The ultimate importance of these
cases is the common foundation upon which their respective
findings were justified. In sum, these cases rested on the
general proposition that the Miranda warnings were merely
"prophylactic, "23  established to protect an accused's Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, and were not
necessarily required by the Constitution.24 The Department of
288 (1989)). In a separate opinion in Davis, Justice Scalia condemned the
Department of Justice for not supporting the enforcement of § 3501 in criminal
prosecutions. See id. at 462-65 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Eric D. Miller,
Should Courts Consider 18 U.S.C. 3501 Sua Sponte?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1029,
1034-35 (1998) (stating that Attorney General Ramsey Clark instructed United
States Attorneys not to admit confessions into evidence unless they comported with
Miranda). Under the Clinton administration, the Department of Justice remained
steadfastly opposed to enforcing § 3501. See Andrew B. Loewenstein, Note, Judicial
Review and the Limits of Prosecutorial Discretion, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 351, 357-63
(discussing the Justice Department's refusal to enforce § 3501); Andrew W. Muller,
Case Note, Congress' Right to Remain Silent in Dickerson v. United States-Or-
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Miranda v. Arizona, 34 CREIGHTON L.
REV., 801, 810-11 (2001).
21 See Laurence H. Tribe, Miranda Warning is Law of the Land, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 15, 1999, at A99; see also 124 CONG. REC. 11,595 (1968) (statement of
Senator Morse) (stating that "the Senate is kidding itself if it thinks it can amend
the Constitution or the Bill of Rights with this [§ 3501] legislation"); STEPHEN A.
SALZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND
COMMENTARY 545 (5th ed. 1996); Yale Kamisar, Perspective on Criminal Law: The
Miranda Warning Takes a Body Blow, LA. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999, at B7.
22 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984) (holding that there is
a public safety exception to Miranda); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26
(1971) (holding that defendant's self-incriminating statements were admissible as
impeaching evidence despite the fact that their admission as substantive evidence
would have been in violation of Miranda).
2 Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1989).
24 See Davis, 512 U.S. at 457 (describing the Miranda warning as a" 'series of
recommended 'procedural safeguards'") (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
443-44 (1974)); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690 (1993) ("Miranda's
safeguards are not constitutional in character."); Barrett, 479 U.S. at 528 (1989)
("ITihe Miranda Court adopted prophylactic rules designed to insulate the exercise
of the Fifth Amendment rights.... ."); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989)
("The prophylactic Miranda warnings are 'not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory
self-incrimination [is] protected.' ") (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444); Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986) (stating that it is well established that the
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Justice's refusal to enforce § 3501, along with the limitations the
Supreme Court placed on Miranda, combined to form a ripe
environment for a court to finally announce that § 3501, rather
than Miranda, was the proper standard for determining the
admissibility of a suspect's confession.25 On February 8, 1999, in
United States v. Dickerson,26 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit did exactly that.27 Later that year, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
holding of the Fourth Circuit;28 the Court reversed, upholding
Miranda.29
This Comment contends that the Supreme Court's decision
to uphold Miranda as the proper standard governing the
admissibility of confessions, rather than apply § 3501, was
Miranda warnings are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution) (quoting
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654).
2 See Sbarra, supra note 8, at 497 (stating that the "interplay between the
Department of Justice's failure to enforce § 3501 and the Supreme Court's limits on
the Miranda rule provided the fuel for the Dickerson court to pronounce § 3501 as
constitutional and to eradicate the necessity for the Miranda warnings").
26 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding § 3501, rather than Miranda, was the
proper standard to determine the admissibility of confessions), rev'd, 530 U.S. 428
(2000). Prior to the Fourth Circuit deciding the Dickerson case, the issue of § 3501's
applicability was squarely dealt with twice before. See United States v. Crocker, 510
F.2d 1129, 1138 (10th Cir. 1975) (holding that the trial court did not err when it
applied § 3501 in concluding the defendant's confession was voluntary); United
States v. Rivas-Lopez, 988 F. Supp. 1424, 1435-36 (D. Utah 1977) (holding that §
3501 is constitutional and thus its analysis is the proper standard to determine
admissibility of defendants' statements).
27 This decision came as a shock to many observers, primarily because the issue
of§ 3501's applicability was not briefed by the Department of Justice on appeal. See
Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 680-81. Regardless, the Fourth Circuit decided the issue sua
sponte. See id. at 680-83. The court's decision to raise the issue sua sponte was met
with opposition. See id. at 695-97 (Michael, J., dissenting) (stating that the court
should not have reached the issue of the statute's application where it was not
presented by the Department of Justice); see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda
Now on the Endangered Species List, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 1, 1999, at A22 (referring to
the Dickerson opinion as the "most surprising and ill-considered instance of 'judicial
activism' in recent memory").
The court justified its action by stating that "we are a court of law and not
politics. Thus, the Department of Justice cannot prevent us from deciding this case
under the governing law simply by refusing to argue it ... ." Dickerson, 166 F.3d at
672. The court accepted a brief and heard oral arguments from the Washington
Legal Foundation, an amicus curiae, to familiarize itself with the issue before
rendering its decision. See id. at 680-82 n.14.
2 See Dickerson v. United States, 528 U.S. 1045 (1999).
29 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (holding that "Miranda
and its progeny... govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial
interrogation in both state and federal courts").
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
erroneous. A thorough reading of Miranda reveals that it was
not a constitutionally grounded decision and therefore Congress,
not the Supreme Court, had the power to enact a superior rule of
evidence. This proposition is supported in Part I of this
Comment by a brief presentation of the relevant facts of
Dickerson, and the district court's handling of the case. Part II,
in addition to exploring the Fourth Circuit's controversial
procedural treatment of the case, considers the justifications
behind its holding. Part III focuses on the Supreme Court's
reversal of the Fourth Circuit's decision and posits various
theories why the Court's rationale was misguided. Finally, Part
IV asserts that although the affirmation of Miranda has littleimmediate practical effect, it has very real and negative
consequences for the future.
I. THE FACTS OF DICKERSON
In early 1997, an individual brandishing a silver semi-
automatic handgun and carrying a black leather bag, stole $876
from the First Virginia Bank.30 An eyewitness spotted the
robber leaving the bank and getting into a white Oldsmobile
Ciera.31 Seconds later, the robber got out of the car, placed
something in the trunk, re-entered the vehicle, and drove off.32
Upon subsequent investigation into the bank robbery, it was
discovered that the white Oldsmobile was registered to Charles
Dickerson of Takoma Park, Maryland. 33 Upon arriving at the
Dickerson residence, law enforcement agents identified the
vehicle in the driveway as the same car used in the robbery.34
The agents then knocked on Dickerson's door and asked him to
accompany them to the office of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) to answer some questions pertaining to a
bank robbery they were investigating.35 As Dickerson reached
for his jacket, one of the agents noticed a large sum of money
resting on the bed.36 Dickerson placed the money in his jacket
pocket, explaining that the funds were the recent spoils of a
30 Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 673. The bank was in Alexandria, Virginia. Id.
31 Id. The eyewitness was also able to identify that it was a District of
Columbia license plate, number D5286. Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
[Vol.75:673
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gambling trip to Atlantic City.37 Dickerson then rode off with
the agents to the FBI office, not yet having been placed under
formal arrest or handcuffed.38
During an interview at the FBI office, Dickerson admitted
that he was in Old Town, a town located near the bank, on the
day of the robbery, but denied having any involvement with the
robbery in question.39 Based on Dickerson's affirmation placing
himself near the bank on the day of the robbery, along with the
detection of a large amount of cash in his home, the agents
obtained a warrant to conduct a search of Dickerson's
apartment.40 After being notified that his apartment was about
to be searched, Dickerson informed the agents that he wanted to
make a statement. 41 He admitted to having been the getaway
driver in numerous robberies, but identified another individual,
Jimmy Rochester, as the person who committed the bank
robbery in question.42 At this point, Dickerson was formally
placed under arrest.43 Jimmy Rochester, who was subsequently
arrested, promptly corroborated Dickerson's story.44 Meanwhile,
the search of Dickerson's apartment and car had produced
evidence connecting him to the Alexandria bank robbery.45
Based on his confession, Rochester's statements, and the
physical evidence uncovered in his apartment and car, Dickerson
was indicted by a federal grand jury on numerous charges of
robbery related crimes.46
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 673-74.
41 Id. at 674.
42 Id.
43 Id. Dickerson told the agents that Rochester gave him a gun and dye-stained
money. Id.
44 Rochester admitted to robbing numerous banks throughout Virginia and
Maryland, and that Dickerson was his getaway driver in each of the robberies. Id.
45 Id. The evidence found included: a silver semi-automatic handgun, dye-
stained money, a "bait-bill", ammunition, masks, latex gloves, and a black leather
bag. Id.
46 Id.
Dickerson was indicted by a federal grand jury on one count of conspiracy
to commit bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C-A. § 371 (West Supp.
1998), on three counts of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2113(a)
and (d) (West Supp. 1998), and three counts of using a firearm during and
in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1)
(West Supp. 1998).
2001] 681
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In the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia, Dickerson filed a motion to suppress the statements
he made while at the FBI office prior to his arrest, along with the
evidence uncovered as a result of those statements.47 At the
suppression hearing, an agent "testified that Dickerson was
read.., his rights under Miranda prior to his confession." 48
Conversely, "Dickerson testified that he confessed prior to being
read... his Miranda rights and about thirty minutes after being
informed about the warrant to search his apartment."49 Having
found defendant Dickerson's testimony more credible,50 the
district court suppressed his confession, thereby excluding from
evidence his inculpatory statement and some of the physical
evidence obtained in its wake.51 Because the Government's
motion to reconsider the district court's order suppressing
Dickerson's statement was denied, 52 the Government filed an
interlocutory appeal.53  In accordance with tradition and
47 Id. The evidence Dickerson sought to suppress was the physical evidence
obtained during the searches of his apartment and his car. Id.
48 Id. at 675. The agent continued to testify that Dickerson made his statement
"shortly after" he obtained the search warrant. Id.
49 Id.
50 This finding rested partly on the fact that the agent's testimony-that
Dickerson had been read his Miranda rights prior to his making the inculpatory
statement-was contradicted by a time line which established that the confession
was given before (8:50 p.m.) Dickerson executed the Advice of Rights Form (9:41
p.m.). Id. at 675-76. M"e documentary evidence, which clearly contradicted [the
agent's] testimony, was not the only reason the district court gave for finding that
[the agent's] testimony lacked creditability." Id. at 675 n.6.
51 Id at 675. Although the district court suppressed Dickerson's statement, the
district court refused to suppress Rochester's statement, which named Dickerson as
the getaway driver. Id. at 676. Applying United States v. Elie, 111 F.3d 1135, 1143
(4th Cir. 1997), the court reasoned that "evidence found as a result of a statement
made in violation of Miranda may only be suppressed if the statement was
involuntary within the meaning of the Due Process Clause .... Because Dickerson's
statement was voluntary.., the evidence found as a result thereof was
admissible.. . ." Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 676. The physical evidence obtained at the
Dickerson residence was suppressed because the warrant was found by the court to
be "insufficiently particular in describing the items to be seized." Id. Finally, the
evidence discovered in the trunk of Dickerson's car was admitted into evidence
because, unlike the warrant to search Dickerson's apartment, this warrant was
sufficiently particular in describing the items to be seized. Id.
52 United States v. Dickerson, 971 F. Supp. 1023, 1025 (E.D. Va. 1997), rev'd,
166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). The Government took the
position in its motion for rehearing that Dickerson's statement was voluntary,
therefore admissible into evidence under 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1985). See Dickerson,
166 F.3d at 676.
53 See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 677.
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Department of Justice policy, the Government promptly
withdrew its contention that Dickerson's statement was
admissible under § 3501.54
II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DECISION
Despite the Government's refusal to raise the issue of
§ 3501's applicability, Judge Karen Williams, writing for the
two-judge majority, considered the issue sua sponte.55  In
concluding that "the proper administration of criminal law
cannot be left merely to the stipulation of [the] parties,"56 the
court of appeals held that § 3501, rather than Miranda, governed
the admissibility of the defendant's statements. 57  Judge
Michael, in his dissenting opinion, stated that in "pressing
§ 3501 into the prosecution of a case against the express wishes
of the Department of Justice, the majority [took] on more than
any court should."53
5 Id. at 672.
55 Id. at 682 (stating that the Government's refusal to raise the issue of the
statute's applicability did not prevent the court from deciding the case); Singleton v.
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976) (stating that the issues to be determined are within
the discretion of the courts of appeals). See generally Carlisle v. United States, 517
U.S. 416 (1996) (discussing the extent to which the district courts have the power to
act sua sponte).
56 Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 682 (quoting Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257,
259 (1942)).
57 Id. at 695. The court, relying on the fact that several exceptions to Miranda
have been established, and that the Supreme Court itself has repeatedly referred to
the Miranda warnings as prophylactic and not required by the Constitution,
concluded that Miranda was not a constitutionally grounded decision. Therefore,
the court continued, Congress possessed the authority to supersede Miranda and
enact federal rules of evidence and procedure. See id. at 690.
The law in this area is well settled. The Supreme Court has supervisory
authority over the federal courts to establish non-constitutional rules of evidence
and procedure. See Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 425-26. The Court's authority to establish
non-constitutional rules of evidence and procedure, however, exists only in the
absence of a relevant act of Congress. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343,
353 n.l1 (1959); see also Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 418 (1953); Funk v.
United States, 290 U.S. 371, 382 (1933). Therefore, "Congress retains the ultimate
authority to modify or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence or procedure
that are not required by the Constitution." Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428, 437 (2000); see also Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265 (1980); Palermo, 360
U.S. at 345-48. Hence, Congress may not legislatively supersede the Court's
decisions that interpret and apply the Constitution. See City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 517-20 (1997) (discussing congressional power to enact legislation
serving to deter or remedy a constitutional violation).
68 Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 695 (Michael, J., dissenting). In declining to join the
majority, Judge Michael advanced several justifications, including the argument
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III. THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING
Upon review, the Supreme Court squarely presented the
issue before it by stating, "This case... turns on whether the
Miranda Court announced a constitutional rule or merely
exercised its supervisory authority to regulate evidence in the
absence of congressional direction."59 Although conceding the
presence of language in prior opinions supporting the position
taken by the Fourth Circuit, the Court reversed the lower court's
finding and held Miranda was indeed a constitutional decision.60
The Court based its conclusion on several seemingly incorrect
suppositions.
First, the Court reasoned that because Miranda and its
progeny have consistently been applied in state tribunals,6 1
Miranda must therefore be of constitutional origin.62  In
conclusive fashion, the Court reached this point by stating that
"[wiith respect to proceedings in state courts, [its] 'authority is
limited to enforcing the commands of the United States
Constitution.'"63 The Court made a similar argument based on
habeas corpus.64 A habeas corpus proceeding is available only
"for claims that a person 'is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.' "65 The
that courts should not interfere with executive discretion in criminal matters. See
id. at 695-97 (Michael, J., dissenting). Perhaps his most compelling argument
against the majority is that Dickerson's confession was examined under the
umbrella of § 3501 when the statute was only raised in an amicus brief. See id. at
697; see also supra note 26. Judge Michael believed this procedure went "against the
adversarial system because it forces judges to rule on issues without the benefit of a
traditional party-based legal argument." Brooke B. Grona, Comment, United States
v. Dickerson: Leaving Miranda and Finding a Deserted Statute, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L.
367, 378-79 (1999) (discussing Judge Michael's dissenting opinion).
59 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437.
60 See id. at 432.
61 See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994) (per curiam); Minnick v.
Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990); Arizona v. Robertson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988);
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
62 See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438.
63 Id. (quoting Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991)); see also Harris v.
Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1981) (per curiam). The Court began its analysis by
establishing that federal courts do not have supervisory power over state courts. See
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982) ("Federal courts hold no supervisory
authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs
of constitutional dimension."); Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 508-09 (1958),
overruled by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
64 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 439 n.3.
65 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)).
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Court drew the inference that because, historically prisoners
have been allowed to bring habeas corpus proceedings in federal
court based on alleged Miranda violations, it must follow that
Miranda is a constitutionally based decision as it does not derive
from federal laws or treaties. 66
Secondly, the Court pointed to numerous textual passages in
both Miranda and subsequent cases containing explicit language
supporting the finding that Miranda is constitutionally
required.67 The Court stated that the purpose of granting
certiorari in Miranda was "to give concrete constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." 68
Next, the Court justified its finding by citing the passage of
text in Miranda which invited Congress to pass legislation to
protect an individual's right against self-incrimination. 69 The
Court asserted that because the invitation was qualified-to the
extent that "the Constitution would not preclude legislative
solutions that differed from the prescribed Miranda warnings
but which were 'at least as effective in appraising accused
persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous
opportunity to exercise it' "70-Miranda was constitutionally
required.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit's contention that Miranda was
not a constitutionally based rule, as evidenced by itshe
numerous exceptions to the Miranda rule, was swept aside by
the Supreme Court.7' Stating that "no constitutional rule is
immutable,"72 the Court reasoned that the existence of
exceptions to Miranda does not negate its constitutionality.
Rather, the exceptions to Miranda "are as much a normal part of
66 Id.
67 See id. at 439-40.
68 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966); see also id. at 490 ("ITihe
issues presented are of constitutional dimensions and must be determined by the
courts."). Similar language appears in cases subsequent to Miranda as well. See
Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691 (1993) (stating that "Miranda safeguards a
Tundamental trial right' ") (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
269, 264 (1990)); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990) (stating that the
Miranda warnings rest on the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination);
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986) (referring to Miranda as the Court's
interpretation of the United States Constitution).
69 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 440.
70 Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
71 See id. at 441.
72 Id.
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constitutional law as the original decision."73
IV. ANALYSIS
It seems illogical to justify Miranda as a constitutionally
based decision merely because its doctrine has been applied in
state court proceedings. Rather, Miranda should be understood
not as a constitutional demand, but as an exercise of the Court's
authority to devise a remedy for a potential violation of a
constitutional right, when neither the legislature nor the
Constitution offers one.74 These improvisational remedies are
known as "constitutional common law,"75 and are not required by
the Constitution but are designed to assist in the protection of
constitutional rights.76 Since constitutional common law applies
to the States as well as the federal government,77 the conclusion
that Miranda is merely a decision of constitutional common law
and not required by the Constitution seems more rational than
the reasoning employed by the Court. It is argued that
congressional action may supersede judicially created
constitutional common law.78 Therefore, it is submitted that the
Fourth Circuit was correct in applying § 3501, rather than the
constitutional common law doctrine of Miranda, as the
appropriate standard governing the admissibility of confessions.
Similarly, the Court was misguided in contending Miranda
was of constitutional origin merely because prisoners in the past
have been allowed to bring habeas corpus proceedings based on
alleged Miranda violations. 79 The Court's reasoning was flawed
when it concluded that because Miranda was not a federal law or
73 Id.
74 See Cassell, supra note 1, at 237. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
75 Craig Goldblatt, Harmless Error as Constitutional Common Law: Congress's
Power to Reverse Arizona v. Fulminate, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 985, 986 (1983)
(explaining "constitutional common law" as a "judicially created prophylactic rule
designed to protect constitutional rights, but not itself an interpretation of the
Constitution").
76 See Cassell, supra note 1, at 237; Goldblatt, supra note 75, at 986; see also
Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term: Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1975).
77 See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656-57.
78 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 51 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
79 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's
analysis regarding habeas corpus proceedings and the constitutionality of Miranda.
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treaty, it must be of constitutional status.80 A "law" for the
purposes of habeas corpus proceedings is simply not confined to
the spectrum of federal statutes.81 Furthermore, in Withrow v.
Williams,8 2 the jurisdictional basis upon which the Court ruled
that Miranda claims can lead to a habeas corpus proceeding is
not at all clear.8 3 Therefore, based on the absence of clear
doctrine in Withrow, the Court's decision that Miranda was of
constitutional status because it is not a law or a statute, is too
attenuated.
By relying on language in Miranda and in later opinions
that suggests Miranda is constitutional in character, the Court
partakes in an ill-advised, two-fold practice. First, nowhere in
Miranda are the warnings ever regarded as strict constitutional
requirements. Second, to read the language in a vacuum ignores
precedent established in subsequent cases. Since Miranda, the
Court has "explicitly, and repeatedly, interpreted that decision
as having announced... only 'prophylactic' rules."8 4 In ignoring
this precedent, the Court clearly strayed from a cornerstone of
the American judicial system-stare decisis-in order to achieve
its seemingly desired outcome.85
Moreover, interpreting the Court's "invitation" to Congress
to pass legislation to protect an accused's right against self-
incrimination-providing any such efforts would not be
precluded by the Constitution and were at least as effective as
Miranda86-is another misreading of the Miranda decision. The
fact that such an "invitation" was even given "provides a striking
80 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
81 See Bush v. Muncy, 659 F.2d 402, 407 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding an interstate
compact to be within the meaning of a "law" for a habeas corpus proceeding);
Cassell, supra note 1, at 240 (stating that "[a] law' for purposes of federal habeas
corpus review. . . consists not merely of federal statutes").
82 507 U.S. 680 (1993).
83 In Stone v. Powell, 228 U.S. 465 (1976), the Court held that "when a State
has given a full and fair chance to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim, federal
habeas review is not available to a state prisoner alleging that his conviction rests
on evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search or seizure." Withrow v.
Williams, 507 U.S. at 682-83. In Withrow, the Supreme Court declined to extend
the restriction announced in Stone to a state prisoner's claim that his conviction was
based on statements obtained in violation of Miranda. See id. at 688-95. The
majority found that the jurisdictional issue was "beyond the question [for which
certiorari was granted]." Id.at 685-86 n.2.
84 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 450 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 465.
8E See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
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reason to view Miranda as a non-constitutional decision."87 It
seems the correct interpretation of the Court's "invitation" in
Miranda is that the Court could simply do away with the
prophylactic safeguards if Congress enacted legislation that was
"at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of
silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it."88
In enacting § 3501, Congress created a statute that extends
beyond the pre- and post-Miranda doctrines that protect an
individual's right against self-incrimination.8 9 One example of
this, § 3501(b)(2), requires that the "defendant knew the nature
of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was
suspected at the time of making the confession. ..."90 This
protection is novel and more inclusive than any protection
afforded to an accused individual by current case law. 91 In short,
the enumerated factors of § 3501 provide an accused with more
protections against self-incrimination than Miranda. A statute
that goes beyond the scope of Miranda is at least as effective as
Miranda.
To determine its efficacy, the statute must also be
considered in light of several other protections available to a
defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 242 states that "[w]hoever, under color of
87 Cassell, supra note 1, at 242 n.315.
88 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467; see also Cassell, supra note 1, at 242 (noting that
"the Court could simply dispense with Miranda safeguards" if it were shown other
procedures that were as effective as the safeguards set forth in Miranda).
89 See Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 SuP.
CT. REv. 81, 129 (stating that § 3501 "does not wholly sweep aside Miranda ...
[and] the legislative enumeration of factors arguably gives them a special status"
that did not necessarily exist before Miranda).
90 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b)(2) (1994); see also 18 U.S.C § 3501(b)(3) (making a
consideration of "whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was
not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used
against him"). "This section is broader than pre-Miranda law in recognizing a
suspect's right to remain silent during police questioning." Cassell, supra note 1, at
244; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (b)(4) (recognizing the right to counsel during
interrogation by requiring consideration of "whether or not such defendant had been
advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel").
91 See Illinois v. Rodriquez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990) (noting that in order for a
defendant to waive his rights he must be "knowing" and "intelligent"); Colorado v.
Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987) (holding that the failure of the police to inform an
accused of the nature of the offense did not affect his decision to waive his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421-
24, 432-34 (1986) (holding that the failure to inform the accused of an attorney's
telephone call to the jail did not deprive him of knowledge essential to waive his
Fifth Amendment rights).
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any law... willfully subjects any person.., to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States... shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both."92 This
civil rights statute will be enforced against law enforcement
agents who coerce statements from an accused in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. 93
In addition to criminal sanctions, civil liability may be
imposed on law enforcement agents who violate a suspect's
constitutional rights. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 94 the Court held that a federal cause of action seeking
damages was viable, where federal agents acting under the color
of their authority violated a suspect's constitutional right.95 The
Bivins doctrine has been consistently applied in situations where
either the Fifth Amendment or the Due Process Clause is
violated in an unconstitutional interrogation.96  In short,
uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of § 3501 is lessened
when it is considered in conjunction with the other available
protections.97
Lastly, the Court's contention that not even a constitutional
rule is immutable does not defeat the argument that the
existence of numerous exceptions to Miranda strongly suggests
that it is not constitutionally required.98 The majority's line of
reasoning is flawed; Miranda is constitutionally required but if
law enforcement agents violate it, they do not violate the
Constitution. 99 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia claims
the majority is "play[ing] word games" by continuing to place a
constitutional stamp on a doctrine it continues to riddle with
92 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994).
93 See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997) (stating that "beating
to obtain a confession plainly violates § 242") (citing Williams v. United States, 341
U.S. 97, 101 (1951)).
9 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
95 See id. at 389. Prior to Bivens, it was not possible to bring a cause of action
seeking damages against a law enforcement official. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678
684-85 (1946).
96 See, e.g., Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194-95 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding a
Biuens claim where due process was violated by police misconduct during an
interrogation).
97 Chief Justice Rehnqist stated that the line of due process jurisprudence
used by the Court before Miranda has not been abandoned, and should not be
forgotten. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000).
98 See id. at 451-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99 See id. at 454.
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exceptions. 100 In light of the cases that have limited the scope of
Miranda, "it is simply no longer possible for the Court to
conclude.., that a violation of Miranda's rules is a violation of
the Constitution."01 It appears that Miranda should no longer
be considered a constitutional rule and its continued
enforcement over that of § 3501 "offends [the] fundamental
principles of separation of powers."10 2
CONCLUSION
Affirming Miranda has little practical effect today, but it
has very real and negative implications for tomorrow.10 3 The
Fourth Circuit made it clear when it dispensed with the notion
that Miranda was required by the Constitution that "nothing
in... [the] opinion provides those in law enforcement with an
incentive to stop giving the now familiar Miranda warnings ....
[T]hose warnings are among the factors a district court should
consider when determining whether a confession was voluntarily
given."10 4 Federal agents continued to dispense the Miranda
warnings in all five states in the Fourth Circuit after its
decision. 05 This is further supported by statements from former
Attorney General Reno pledging allegiance to Miranda even if
Miranda were to be overturned by the Court. 06
Nevertheless, the affirmation of Miranda has very real and
negative consequences for the future. Despite the Miranda
Court's assurance that "[its] decision in no way creates a
constitutional straightjacket which will handicap sound efforts
at reform," no efforts of reform have been made other than the
passage of § 3501.107
The Miranda decision has petrified the law of pre-trial
interrogation for the past twenty years, foreclosing the
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 See Scott Turow, Miranda's Values in the Trenches, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
2000, at A27 ("[Tihe truth is that... [upholding] Miranda has little practical impact
on the interaction between suspects and [law enforcement agencies].").
104 United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 692 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S.
428 (2000).
105 See Cassell, supra note 1, at 251.
106 See Brief for the Appellee at 35 n.21, Dickerson v. United States, 520 U.S.
428 (2000) (No. 99-5525) ("Federal law enforcement agencies would, as a matter of
policy, continue to comply with the warnings requirements of Miranda.").
107 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
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possibility of developing and implementing alternatives that
would be more effective, both in protecting the public from crime
and in ensuring fair treatment of persons suspected of crime.
Nothing is likely to change in the future as long as Miranda
remains in effect and perpetuates a perceived risk of invalidation
for any alternative system that departs from it.108
Unfortunately, it appears that the 5-4 decision from 1966
will "forever be enshrined as the mandate approach for
regulating police interrogation"'0 9 until the Court itself takes on
a legislative role and unilaterally decides that the nation and
criminal justice are best served by other means. This
proposition conflicts with the fundamental notion of separation
of powers and with the belief that the law should twist and turn
in harmony with society.110 Miranda survives despite more
effective alternatives and the fact that guilty persons are set free
on Miranda technicalities. Are these acceptable costs?
The Supreme Court chose to affirm Miranda. An
opportunity for change has been lost. The projection of Justice
White's dissent in Miranda rings more true than ever before: "In
some unknown number of cases the Court's rule [in Miranda]
will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the streets... to
repeat his crime whenever it pleases him.""' l Even if this
possibility is remote, is the cost simply too high?
108 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, Report to the Attorney
General of the Law of Pre-trial Interrogation 55 (1986).
109 Cassell, supra note 1, at 257 (explaining that Miranda is not the definitive
response to protections embodied by the Fifth Amendment).
110 See generally McLamore v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 934, 936 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.")
(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).
Ill Miranda, 384 U.S. at 542 (White, J., dissenting).
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